All quiet on the blogging front, due to the imminent deadline of my MSt. dissertation. However, I thought my dear faithful readers (both of you) might like to have an idea of what I'm writing about. So here's the latest draft of my thesis abstract (subject to change, of course), still currently using the working title of British Policy and the Process of Decolonization in Singapore, 1955-59. That will change as soon as I think of something witty or a pithy quote to use. All good dissertations need a witty or pithy quote- it's the unwritten rule of history essay writing!

Abstract
This article explores Singapore’s progress towards self-government between the institution of the Rendel Constitution in 1955 and the achievement of self-government in 1959. In particular, it considers the decision-making process followed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Alan Lennox-Boyd, the British Cabinet, and the colonial administration in Singapore, as well as relationship of the British with the first three local leaders of Singapore- David Marshall, Lim Yew Hock and Lee Kuan Yew. It also reconsiders the contributions of the three men to Singapore’s internal stability and her achievement of self-government in 1959. Through this, it examines the process of transition in politics and the roles it forces upon its participants.

Declassified British documents from this period, along with interviews of senior British and Singaporean figures, reveal that Lennox-Boyd followed a consistent policy on Singapore. While there were strategic concerns, the overriding concern faced by Lennox-Boyd was political. The question was not whether to give Singapore self-government, but to find a suitable person to hand over to, at a time which would gain greatest political capital and goodwill for the British government in Britain, Singapore and at large.

However, due to the sensitive nature of the transition, the appearance presented by both sides was necessarily deceptive and confusing. Every politician during this time had to be very sensitive of how they appeared to their colleagues, to those opposing them, and to their electorate. In order to achieve their goals, British and Singaporean leaders had to often take up positions and employ rhetoric which were completely at odds with their actual convictions. The discussions over Singapore’s future show that public opinion was the primary consideration at all stages of negotiation and decision-making.

Thus, the dramatic failure of the 1956 constitutional talks was due to Marshall being trapped by his own public rhetoric, but compounded by the British desire to appear willing to negotiate and by the other Singaporeans need to appear as anti-British as possible. Lim, on the other hand, was able to give the British a safe situation in which they could make concessions while enhancing public opinion in general(especially key in the light of the Suez crisis) and without endangering their strategic interests.

Furthermore, the need to mask true intentions meant that while Lee was recognized early on as being a man of substantial ability and talent, it was not until late-1957 that the British were convinced that he was not a communist, and even as they handed power over to him and the People’s Action Party in 1959, they still remained sceptical of his ability to defeat the radical left-wing members of his party. Far from Lee being seen early as a ‘chosen man’, the British hoped to continue doing business with the known quantity of Lim after 1959.

Singapore thus provides a case study of the considerations and dilemmas of British policy during the transition between British control and internal self-government. In particular, it shows the process of decolonisation primarily as a political process, where public opinion (and in particular, popular nationalism) needs to be managed and manipulated, and how opposing politicians need to compete and collaborate in order to achieve their goals.