Nationality, Ethnicity and Politics in China

Comments: This paper began very promisingly, with an opening paragraph that summarised well the problems at hand and promised to examine the issue of seperatism and ethnicity/nationality in China. However, I got carried away in research, and under pressures of my deadline, ended up writing too much detail and too little analysis- in short, it finished as more of a general survey of nationalism and seperatism in China then in answering, 'Why?'

The problems of ethnicity in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are not, at first glance, obvious. To most people, the word Chinese implies both a citizenship and a race, as China is one of the few countries in the world that is overwhelmingly culturally and ethnically homogenous. With 92% of 1.2 billion people in China belonging to the Han Chinese majority, the remaining fifty-five officially recognised nationalities are often overlooked. Most of these minorities are well integrated into mainstream social, economic and political life, with many of them culturally indistinguishable from Han Chinese, and even more coexisting side-by-side with Han Chinese neighbours. Other areas where minority nationalities are in the majority have been designated as autonomous regions, and in these regions, members of minority nationalities hold most state positions. A Mongol, Ulanhu, has served as the Vice-President of the PRC. Equality of the different nationalities and protection from discrimination is enshrined in the constitution of the PRC. Yet while ethnicity itself is not an issue, the classification of people into ethnic groups is highly politicised and is intimately linked with issues of economic discrimination and separatism. As the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has staked its mandate to rule upon its ability to bring economic prosperity and unity to China, these are two issues that strike at the heart of the CCP’s legitimacy. Economic discrimination against minorities undermines the continued prosperity of China, and contributes to the separatist movements in areas like Tibet and Xinjiang. Furthermore, these separatist movements are almost entirely comprised of minorities dissatisfied with Han Chinese rule. As the separatist movements are indistinguishable from the nationalities that sponsor them, the CCP has come to associate the problem with the nationalities and thus attempted to deal with the problem along ethnic lines.

Ethnicity is primarily a social concept, because unlike the idea of race, there is no biological basis for ethnicity. It has been defined variously as the “sentiment of loyalty towards a distinctive population, cultural group or territorial area” (Heywood 226) or the “perception of shared culture, one or more aspect of which will be used primordially as a charter for membership” (Negata 96). While the idea of common descent may be used as part of the basis of membership in an ethnicity, more often an ethnic group is defined by a consensus among the members of the group as to the qualifications for membership, and this is usually on the basis of culture. However, as the ethnic group is primarily a social concept, equally important in how an ethnic group defines itself is the perception or treatment of the group by those outside. It is impossible for a social group to exist in isolation, as it is also in its relationships with other groups and with the state that the group is defined. In the Chinese system, the role that the state plays is greatly enlarged due to the immense power that it wields.

In China, the state classifies people into minzu, which can be loosely translated into English as “nationality.” The entire country is classified into fifty-six nationalities, ostensibly according to four kinds of basic criteria as outlined by Stalin: common territory, common language, common economic life, and common culture (Mackerras 141). The state being the final arbiter of what constitutes a nationality, it has freedom to disregard each criterion as it sees fit. For example, the Hui and Manchu nationalities are scattered over many parts of China and it is highly doubtful whether they still share a common territory. Also, almost all members of the two groups speak Chinese as their native language. While there are a few Manchu who still speak Manchu and the Hui in Tibet speak Tibetan, one cannot say that either nationality continues to share a common language. While a child of two different nationalities can choose which nationality he or she wishes to be classified under, and groups can present evidence to have themselves reclassified under a different nationality or even as an entirely new nationality (such as the Jinuo, who succeeded in being recognised after the establishment of the system in 1956), neither an individual nor a group can change their nationality simply on the basis of their own opinion, or the opinion of other groups. Change of an official nationality is only done on the basis of adherence to the official Stalinist criteria, so while a nationality may challenge the definition, it cannot ignore it or its ramifications. Despite this, many minority groups have enthusiastically embraced their designations, displaying pride in their nationality and unique culture (Mackerras 143-145). In China, therefore, a nationality is a political designation as well as a social one, with both a social basis and a political rationale.

While policy toward the minority nationalities has long been motivated by a desire to integrate the minorities into mainstream Han Chinese life and into Communist thought, the CCP has found it necessary to allow and even encourage minority cultures to flourish. Mao Zedong echoed Marx in believing that the problem of nationalities was one of class, and that nationality or ethnic differences would disappear when class disappeared. The previous disadvantages suffered by the minority nationalities, he argued, was the rest of an alliance between the bourgeoisie of the Han majority with the bourgeoisie of the minorities to oppress the working class of all groups, and when class was overthrown, economic differences between the different nationalities would disappear (Dreyer 261). At the same time, it was believed that a transitional stage of revolution would have to be passed through before China could progress to a socialist revolution and finally enter a period of true communism. During the transitional period, those of differing background could join in a united front against imperialism. Minority groups were considered part of this united front, with the distinction that since they were in general more backward than other components, it was anticipated that they would remain in the transitional period for a longer time. Since nationality characteristics could not be expected to fade out of existence until class differences had ended (and in fact, Lenin believed that they would continue to survive long after class differences were gone), they had to be tolerated for the time being (Zhou 54-56; “Summary ”69-81). A system of autonomous regions was created, to allow for the concrete and unhindered manifestation of these differences. It was hoped that allowing the relatively free expression of ethnic characteristics would lead to a gradual diminution of nationality tensions and result in more harmonious relations among different nationalities. As trust among nationalities increased, the close connection between nationality and political loyalty would diminish, allowing for the gradual creation of a unified or even homogenous culture. Thus, paradoxically, the first step toward eliminating nationality characteristics was to allow them to flourish (Liu 93-96; Eberhard 155-156). In this vein, minority rights were guaranteed in the Constitution of the PRC. Minority nationalities have also been given preferential treatment in terms of developmental aid, affirmative action, and exemptions from the stringent population control program (“National Minorities Policy” sec. 4; also Zhou and Liu). Despite the immense changes that the CCP has undergone in the past two decades, with changes to policy and a revamp of priorities, the party continues to encourage the minority nationalities to flourish and grants them autonomy and freedom of expression for their unique cultural traits. The most recent revision of the constitution, adopted in 1982, continues to uphold the equality of all nationalities and prohibit any form of discrimination against minorities in Article 4:

All nationalities in the People's Republic of China are equal. The state protects the lawful rights and interests of the minority nationalities and upholds and develops the relationship of equality, unity and mutual assistance among all of China's nationalities. Discrimination against and oppression of any nationality are prohibited; any acts that undermine the unity of the nationalities or instigate their secession are prohibited. The state helps the areas inhabited by minority nationalities speed up their economic and cultural development in accordance with the peculiarities and needs of the different minority nationalities. Regional autonomy is practised in areas where people of minority nationalities live in compact communities; in these areas organs of self- government are established for the exercise of the right of autonomy. All the national autonomous areas are inalienable parts of the People's Republic of China. The people of all nationalities have the freedom to use and develop their own spoken and written languages, and to preserve or reform their own ways and customs (“Constitution of the People’s Republic of China,” emphasis added).

At the same time, the article upholds a second important principle- that the unity of the PRC is paramount, and even the slightest hint of it will be prevented at all costs.

In practice, this has led the party to wage a campaign against two evils. The first is ‘Chinese chauvinism’ (Mao 101), which mainly means Han Chinese chauvinism. While in the autonomous regions senior government posts are often allocated to minorities, the real administrative and political power resides in the parallel organisational hierarchy of the Communist Party, whose leading officials at all levels are mostly Han Chinese. In China, where much business is still conducted along networks of familiarity (guanxi), the control of power by Han Chinese has allowed Han Chinese companies to prosper. For example, Human Rights Watch reports on their website that Han Chinese enterprises have often monopolised access to scarce natural resources at the expense of the indigenous rural population (“Xinjiang”). At the same time, for historical and geographical reasons, the inland regions in China, which are where the bulk of the minorities are, have prospered and progressed less than the coastal regions, which are overwhelmingly Han Chinese. Ironically, instead of producing greater stability and social cohesiveness in the region, increased prosperity has only exacerbated the ethnic and political issues between the local Uygurs in Xinjiang and the Han Chinese, and has also increased separatist and secessionist tendencies. As Mackerras writes, “That the process of liberalisation and reform should express themselves in secessionist tendencies among minority nationalities is scarcely surprising because a rapid freeing up of an authoritarian system inevitably creates social contradictions and problems for a centralised state” (162). This has been illustrated dramatically in the break-up of the Soviet Union and in Russia, and is one reason why Beijing works so hard to maintain the unity of the PRC.

The other evil is usually referred to as ‘local nationalism,’ meaning the tendency of minority nationalities to secede from the PRC. The CCP has always placed an extremely high priority on national unity. Next to its own overthrow, its greatest fear has always been the secession of nationality regions and the consequent disintegration of the PRC. This belief in the unity of China is not new- to the contrary, it dates back to Imperial times. Unlike Europe, which although unified under one Empire at several times kept fragmenting back into different states, the Chinese have consistently sought to unify themselves, and from the Sui Dynasty onward have enjoyed almost unbroken rule under a single government. The CCP invests part of their mandate to govern in their claim to all of China (as the Taiwan problem has so vividly illustrated), and thus will act quickly to quash any acts that are perceived as secessionist or separatist. In addition, many regions in West China, including the two hotspots of Tibet and Xinjiang, hold vast amounts of natural resources. Xinjiang, in particular, is expected to be the largest domestic source of energy in China, with oil reserves totalling 3.3 billion barrels and gas reserves reaching 1.16 trillion cubic metres (“Xinjiang” People’s Daily 22/02/2001). In its quest to reduce its reliance on imports for its basic necessities, Xinjiang hold great promise for China and has earned the nickname ‘the Sea of Hope’ (“Xinjiang” People’s Daily 09/12/2000). For bothpolitical and non-political reasons, China cannot afford to lose the region.

Unlike neighbouring Tibet, Xiniang’s separatists have resorted to violence as a means of achieving their goals. Beijing has reacted there with force and repression in order to maintain control over the region, particularly because of networks of Muslim terrorists located outside China, whose sympathies with the Muslim Uygurs in Xinjiang are a threat to China’s national security. Under China’s liberal policies in the late 1970s and 1980s, Xinjiang enjoyed significant religious freedom and protection from discrimination. However, since the early 1990s, the growing strength of the Islamic cultural and religious movement, combined with the regional effect of the break-up of the Soviet Union, has led to a corresponding increase in separatist activity in Xinjiang. In response, Beijing has attempted to force cultural assimilation on the Uygurs, firstly by continuously increasing the number of Han Chinese in the region; Secondly by the complete repression of Islamic culture, including the closing of mosques, banning of the reading of the Koran, and the banning of demonstrations and the use of violence and intimidation; and thirdly by preventing any other state from supporting the Uygurs. If not controlled, the dissension in Xinjian could flow over into the rest of the country. Robert Karniol, Asia Pacific editor of Jane’s Defence Weekly, has described Beijing as “trying to contain a potentially much greater problem while it's still at a containable stage” (qtd. in Page). In effect, Beijing has equated the Uygur nationality with the separatist movement, and by assimilating them, hopes to end secessionist pressure from within China and distance it from the separatist pressure from outside China. This policy has also been implemented in Tibet for similar reasons.

Thus, because of the intimate links between nationality and China’s economic inequalities as well as separatism, Beijing has dealt with both issues as nationalistic issues, attempting to accelerate the increase of economic prosperity in minority areas in order to address the inequalities and decrease secessionist desires, as well as attempting to forcibly assimilate the minorities to remove the root of the problem. Among the more prosperous and integrated minorities, for example the Zhuang, Bai and Yi in rich South China, expressions of nationalism and unique cultural characteristics continue to be encouraged, and in return aid and affirmative action continues to flow. These minorities serve as an example of what Beijing wants from its minority nationalities: they are enthusiastic, well behaved and integrated members of society. The alternative is forced assimilation and disintegration of culture.

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